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The demonstration by Smith [1962] that prices and allocations quickly converge to the competitive equilib-
rium in the continuous double auction (CDA) was one of the ﬁrst – and remains one of the most important
– results in experimental economics. His initial experiment, subsequent market experiments, and models of
price adjustment and exchange have added considerably to our knowledge of how markets reach equilibrium,
and how they respond to disruptions. Perhaps the best known model of exchange in CDA market experiments
is the random behavior in the “zero-intelligence” (ZI) model by Gode and Sunder [1993]. They conclude
that even without trader rationality the CDA generates eﬃcient allocations and “convergence of transaction
prices to the proximity of the theoretical equilibrium price,” provided only that agents meet their budget
constraints. We demonstrate that – by any reasonable measure – prices don’t converge in their simulations.
Their budget constraint requires that a buyer’s currency never exceeds her value for the commodity, which
is an unnatural restriction. Their conclusion that market eﬃciency results from the structure of the CDA
independent of traders’ proﬁt seeking behavior rests on their claim that the constraints that they impose
are a part of the market institution, but this is not so. We show that they in eﬀect impose individual ratio-
nality, which is an aspect of agents’ behavior. Researchers on learning in markets have been misled by their
interpretation of the ZI simulations, with deleterious eﬀects on the debate on market adjustment processes.
Keywords: Bounded rationality; double auction; exchange economy; experimental economics; market exper-
iment; “zero intelligence” model
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1 Introduction
Hayek [1945] asked how interactions among many buyers and sellers in a market coordinate dispersed
information to reach an eﬃcient allocation at stable prices. Chamberlin [1948] found that when
buyers and sellers randomly encounter one another, negotiate prices, and possibly trade, prices
are volatile and extracted surplus is only a fraction of available surplus. Smith [1962] had a key
insight into the convergence process. He replaced Chamberlin’s decentralized information with the
centralized information of the continuous double auction (CDA), and found that trade prices quickly
approached the competitive equilibrium price, and extracted surplus approximated the competitive
equilibrium surplus. His experiment provided a framework for analysis of Hayek’s question. In
Smith’s CDA experiment, the experimenter induces costs and values that are private information
in naturally occurring markets. Induced costs and values combined with public data on bids, asks,
and trade prices are crucial for development of models of behavior in the CDA.
Several such models have been developed. These include the strategic model in Wilson [1986],
three models that depart from full rationality – Friedman [1991], Easley and Ledyard [1993], and
Gjerstad and Dickhaut [1998] – and the model of random behavior by Gode and Sunder [1993].1
Gode and Sunder reach the most striking conclusions. They assert (p. 135) that in the CDA the
“convergence of price to equilibrium and the extraction of almost all the total surplus seem to be
consequences of the double-auction rules.” The purpose of this paper is to assess these two claims:
neither claim withstands scrutiny. Consequently their position that trader rationality is largely
unnecessary in models of market dynamics lacks foundation.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the model by Gode and Sunder,
indicate its inﬂuence among researchers on learning in markets, and evaluate their two main claims.
Prices from their simulations belie their claim that prices converge. Their claim that allocations are
eﬃcient in the absence of trader rationality or proﬁt seeking behavior relies on their peculiar “budget
constraint,” whereby no trader can come to the market with currency that exceeds her value for the
commodity. In Section 3 we demonstrate that markets with induced costs and values are equivalent
to exchange economies, and we use our exchange economy representation to demonstrate that the
constraints imposed by Gode and Sunder are in fact individual rationality constraints. In Section 4
we consider examples that suggest the fundamental economic signiﬁcance of the market adjustment
problem, and indicate several challenges that serious models of adjustment should confront.
2 Gode and Sunder’s zero-intelligence model
Gode and Sunder populate a market with simple bidding agents – which they call zero-intelligence
(ZI) traders – in order to assess the forces that generate eﬃcient outcomes in CDA markets. In
a CDA market, a seller may submit an ask at any time during a trading period. Similarly, at
any time a buyer may submit a bid. An ask placed at or below the current high bid results in a
trade at the bid price; a bid that meets or exceeds the current low ask results in a trade at the
ask price. In the simulations that Gode and Sunder conduct, their ZI-constrained (ZI-C) traders
1 Cason and Friedman [1996] compare predictions of the ﬁrst two and the last of these ﬁve models to outcomes
from market experiments with human subjects. Gjerstad [2007] brieﬂy summarizes all ﬁve models.INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 2
have restricted bids or oﬀers: a ZI-C buyer bids between zero and her budget; a ZI-C seller submits
ask prices between his cost and some upper bound. They call this budget constraint “the market
discipline” (p. 123) because the market prevents agents from violating their budget constraints.
They compare outcomes of markets populated with these ZI-C traders to markets populated with
ZI unconstrained (ZI-U) traders that are not subject to these constraints. In the ﬁrst paragraph of
their conclusions (p. 134), they summarize the conclusions that they draw from this comparison.
“The primary cause of the high allocative eﬃciency of double auctions is the market discipline
imposed on traders; learning, intelligence, or proﬁt motivation is not necessary. The same
market discipline also plays an important role in the convergence of transaction prices to
equilibrium levels.”
These claims in their conclusions reiterate their earlier claims about price convergence2 and the
source of market eﬃciency.3 Our objective is to demonstrate that these two claims are erroneous.
Nevertheless, their argument has misled many researchers and has been widely accepted.4,5
2 “Convergence of transaction prices to the proximity of the theoretical equilibrium price in ZI-C markets is a
consequence of the market discipline.” (p. 131)
3 “Eﬃciency of the double auction derives largely from its structure, independent of traders’ motivation, intelli-
gence, or learning.” (p. 119); “Adam Smith’s invisible hand may be more powerful than some have thought; it can
generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality.” (p. 119);
“A double auction ... can sustain high levels of allocative eﬃciency even if agents do not ... seek proﬁts.” (p. 120);
“[A ZI trader] has no intelligence [and it] does not seek ... proﬁts.” (p. 121) “Our point is that imposing market
discipline on random, unintelligent behavior is suﬃcient to raise the eﬃciency from the baseline level to almost 100
percent in a double auction. The eﬀect of human motivations ... has a second-order magnitude at best.” (p. 134)
4 As of July 2007, there have been 102 citations of the paper in the Social Sciences Citation Index; ﬁfty-four of
these are since 2003. The average number of citations is 48.8 for the ﬁfty-three papers published in the JPE in 1993;
only six have more than 102 citations.
5 “The rules for competition, if well designed, can ensure that a market produces an allocation that is close to
eﬃcient even with traders who are incapable of calculating what is in their interest, according to experiments by
Gode and Sunder (1993). The wisdom of the market compensates for the market participants’ lack of rationality.”
(McAfee and McMillan [1996], emphasis added.) “Gode and Sunder (1993) give examples of double auction markets
in which “zero-intelligence” traders (computers which bid randomly subject only to budget constraints) may achieve
near perfect market eﬃciency.” (Conlisk [1996], emphasis added.) “Gode and Sunder ...ﬁnd that market eﬃciency
levels close to 100% are attained even when their traders have “zero intelligence” in the sense that they submit random
bids and asks that are subject only to a budget constraint.” (Tesfatsion [2002], emphasis added.) “[T]he continuous
ﬂow of oﬀers, coupled with traders’ budget constraints, generates a mechanical but powerful push in the direction
of eﬃcient outcomes.” (Samuelson [2005], emphasis added.) “Gode and Sunder (1993) ...suggest that eﬃciency of
the double-auction institution derives largely from its structure rather than from individual learning.” (List [2005],
emphasis added.) “[I]t has been repeatedly observed that, in laboratory experiments, double-auction institutions
consistently produce allocations and prices close to the predictions of price-taking models. These predictions are
even sustained when subjects are random decision-makers as in Gode and Sunder (1993).” (Bosch-Dom` enech and
Silvestre [1997], emphasis added.) “Gode and Sunder (1993) supported market “rationality” even when composed of
“irrational” economic units. ... Eﬃciency derived mainly from the structure of the market itself rather than from the
advantages typically ascribed to human economic agents (i.e., motivation, intelligence, and learning ability). (Evans
[1997].) “Contrary to one of the shibboleths of neoclassical economics on the necessity for explicit optimization by
agents at a micro level for allocative eﬃciency in markets, they [Gode and Sunder] found that it is the operation of the
rules of double auction that is instrumental for over 90% of allocative eﬃciency even with so-called zero intelligence
traders.” (Markose, Arifovic, and Sunder [2007], emphasis added.)INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 3
Gode and Sunder characterize our position as a disagreement about the speciﬁcation of zero on
the intelligence scale, and argue that the speciﬁc reference point doesn’t matter. This misses our
point. Gode and Sunder claim that when the market institution enforces the traders’ budget con-
straints (or imposes “the market discipline”), that leads to price convergence and market eﬃciency.
We dispute this conclusion. We show that their constraint cannot be meaningfully interpreted as a
budget constraint. Rather, the constraint they impose can only be interpreted as a restriction on
traders’ behavior. Since their ZI-C simulations reach eﬃcient outcomes and their ZI-U simulations
do not, it follows that some restriction on trader behavior is crucial for market eﬃciency. Moreover,
price convergence requires some form of learning or adaptation.
2.1 Price convergence
Numerous CDA experiments beginning with Smith [1962] demonstrate that trades by human sub-
jects quickly and reliably converge to the equilibrium price. Gode and Sunder claim that they
obtain “convergence of transaction prices to equilibrium levels” in their markets with budget con-
strained traders. Figures 1 (a) and (b) compare a representative outcome from a simulation of the
ZI model to a representative outcome from an experiment with human subjects. Comparison of
these two price paths demonstrates that their claim is incorrect.6 Further comparison with a model
that includes simple learning demonstrates that something more than individual rationality – but
far less than full strategic rationality – approximates the competitive equilibrium outcome.
Although ZI-C simulations fail to converge, the simple heuristic belief learning (HBL) model
from Gjerstad [2007] (based on the model in Gjerstad and Dickhaut [1998]) leads to price conver-
gence in a standard market experiment with induced values and costs. Figure 1 (c) demonstrates
that price standard deviations with this model are similar to markets with human subjects.7 Price
standard deviations from the ZI model exceed those from human subject experiments and from
the HBL model by a factor of about ﬁve. Figure 1 (d) reinforces the point that the HBL model
captures price convergence. This ﬁgure depicts the outcome from a market with HBL model sellers
and human buyers. Among ﬁve ﬁfteen period sessions with HBL model agents on one side of the
market and human subjects on the other side of the market, in this trading period the price stan-
dard deviation was lowest. The median of the price standard deviation is nearly 20 times as large
in ZI simulations as it is in this period with sharp price convergence.
Prices in the Gode and Sunder model ﬂuctuate in a range that is bounded above by the highest
unit value of the buyers and below by the lowest unit cost of the sellers. These ranges tend to
narrow as trade proceeds within a period, but in each new period values and costs are renewed.
Their deﬁnition of price convergence appears particularly contrived when it is interpreted in a
practical context. Suppose that grain distributors and food producers arrive at the Minneapolis
Grain Exchange to trade Hard Red Spring Wheat, with quotes in single contracts for 5000 bushels.
Would we say that the market price had converged if at 9:35 a.m. – just after the market opens – the
6 In these two graphs, the standard deviations of trade prices in the selected periods are closest to the median of
this statistic from simulations of 150 periods with the ZI-C model (median standard deviation 8.53) and for periods
6 – 15 from each of ﬁve sessions with human subjects (median standard deviation 1.70).
7 Figure 1 (c) shows the price sequence from the HBL model simulation that is closest to the median standard
deviation from all 15 periods in ten simulations (median standard deviation 1.74).INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 4
(a) ZI simulation (b) Human subjects
(c) Heuristic belief model (d) Human buyers vs. HBL model sellers




































Figure 1: Supply, demand, and trade prices from models and experiments.
ﬁrst buyer paid $624, at 9:45 a.m. the next buyer paid $371, later the third paid $736, and so on all
day, until the last buyer paid $514 at 1:13 p.m., where $514 is close to the price at the intersection
of supply and demand? In the Gode and Sunder story not only does this happen on the ﬁrst day,
something similar happens day after day. The benchmark for price convergence should be more
substantial than either (1) trade of the last unit in the period near the competitive equilibrium
price or (2) convergence in mean. In CDA experiments price convergence is much more robust.
2.2 The “budget constraint” fallacy
The interpretation of the budget constraint in Gode and Sunder is inconsistent with both economic
theory and common sense. Their budget constrained buyer always arrives at a market with an
amount of money exactly equal to her value for the commodity she intends to purchase. This
constraint cannot be interpreted as a budget constraint or as a form of market discipline. Surely,
if a buyer arrives at the market with currency M, there is an economic rationale for the market
organizers to restrict her bids b to the interval [0,M], otherwise she won’t be able to make payment
if she bids more than M and ends up trading at a price greater than M. The inequality b ≤ M in
the budget constraint is perfectly sensible. What happens when M exceeds the buyer’s value? WhyINDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 5
should the market organizers restrict her currency to M ≤ v? Of course they have no reason to do
so, and they have no capacity to do so. The market organizers don’t care if a buyer brings more
money to the market than her value for her intended purchase. Even if they did have a reason to
impose this restriction, they don’t know the value(s) of a buyer, and typically they will not know
the amount of money that a buyer brings to the market, so they couldn’t carry out this restriction
if they had the desire to do so. The restriction that M ≤ v is entirely unnatural.8 The combination
of the legitimate constraint b ≤ M and the fallacious constraint M ≤ v leads to their restriction
that bids must be no more than the buyer’s value. Most importantly, this fallacious constraint is
the basis of their argument that its enforcement is a form of market discipline, which in turn leads
to their conclusions that “the convergence of price to equilibrium and the extraction of almost all
the total surplus seem to be consequences of the double auction rules” (p. 135).
2.3 Individual rationality and market eﬃciency
We’ve now established that the constraints Gode and Sunder impose are neither budget constraints
nor a form of market discipline. Section 3 demonstrates that their constraints conform to individual
rationality constraints.9 Their ZI-C simulations – in which their agents exhibit individual rationality
– achieve Pareto optimal allocations; their unconstrained (ZI-U) traders do not reach Pareto optimal
outcomes. The diﬀerent performance of the ZI-C and ZI-U traders – combined with the fact that
their constraints can only be meaningfully interpreted as aspects of trader behavior rather than
budget constraints or as a form of market discipline – demonstrates that it is trader behavior that
generates price convergence and eﬃciency in the CDA, not the structure of the market rules.
3 An exchange economy formulation of induced costs and values
In Section 3.1 we construct a buyer’s quasi-linear utility function from a vector of values and show
that constrained maximization of the utility function yields a demand function that is dual to the
vector of values. In Section 3.2 we follow a similar procedure for sellers. In Section 3.3 we use
these constructions to demonstrate that the constraints imposed by Gode and Sunder are in fact
individual rationality constraints.
3.1 Induced values and quasi-linear utility








j ≥ ··· ≥ v
nj
j > 0. The total redemption value to buyer j when she purchases y units is
rj(y) =
(




j , y = 1, 2, 3,... .
8 Surely this constraint isn’t a part of any conceivable free market: its enforcement would require interrogation,
unrestricted searches, and conﬁscation of assets; even so it could be evaded if a buyer simply misrepresents her value.
9 Following Luce and Raiﬀa [1957, pp. 192 – 193], by individual rationality we mean that an agent only attempts
to take part in a trade that increases, or at least leaves constant, his own utility.INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 6
We use the buyer’s redemption value function rj(·) to develop the buyer’s quasi-linear utility
function. Deﬁne the consumption space of buyer j as X × Y , and let (xj,yj) ∈ X × Y denote
the units of currency X and commodity Y held by buyer j. The utility function of buyer j is
uj(x, y) = x + rj(y) + Mj (1)
where Mj is a constant.10 Equation (1) is linear in the currency (X) and additively separable in







suﬃcient to guarantee that buyer j would be able to purchase each unit at any price at or below
the value of the unit.
Theorem 1 The demand for Y by buyer j – derived from maximization of equation (1) for a
suﬃciently large endowment – is dual to vj.
Proof The vector vj of values is non-increasing, so that the total value function rj(y) is (weakly)
concave for y ∈ Y . Therefore the utility function uj(x, y) = x + rj(y) + Mj is (weakly) quasi-
concave. The theorem of the maximum implies that for any given price p of good Y , the set of
values that maximize uj(·) is convex.
Let yj(p) be the demand of buyer j at price p, i.e., the solution to the maximization problem
for uj(x, y). We complete the proof by showing that the demand yj(p) has the same graph as the
vector vj of values. If p = vk
j, then yj(p) ∈ {k − 1, k}. If p ∈ (vk+1
j , vk
j), then yj(p) = k.
3.2 Induced costs and quasi-linear utility





the commodity endowment for seller i is y
0
i = mi. Element ck
i is the marginal cost incurred by
seller i when he produces his kth unit. The marginal cost of any unit beyond mi is inﬁnite. For
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., mi} the redemption value for seller i when he sells k units is
ri(k) =
(




i, k = 1, 2, ..., mi.
We use the redemption value function of seller i to deﬁne his quasi-linear utility function as
ui(x, y) = x + ri(mi − y), 0 ≤ y ≤ mi. (2)
Theorem 2 Seller i’s supply of Y – derived from maximization of equation (2) – is dual to ci.
Proof The vector ci of costs is non-decreasing, so that the total value function ri(k) is (weakly)
concave for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., mi}, as is ri(mi−y) for y ∈ {1, 2, ..., mi}. Therefore the utility function
10 The constant Mj has no theoretical implications but is relevant to experimental studies. If buyer j has the initial
endowment (x
0




j , 0) = 0 so that the autarky outcome has payoﬀ 0.
11 Our rationalization of the induced demand schedule as the solution to the constrained maximization of a quasi-
linear utility function is similar to the construction by Smith [1982, p. 932]. Smith derives the induced demand curve
by maximizing the utility function uj(x, y) = x+rj(y) subject to the budget constraint x+py ≤ 0 where x ≤ 0 and
y ≥ 0. In contrast, we deﬁne ﬁnite positive endowments of X for buyers and of Y for sellers that are consistent with
the typical speciﬁcation of consumer choice problems.INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 7
ui(x, y) = x+ri(mi −y) is (weakly) quasi-concave. The theorem of the maximum implies that for
any given price p of good Y , the set of values that maximize ui(·) is convex.
Let yi(p) be the supply of seller i at price p, i.e., the solution to the maximization problem for
ui(x, y). We complete the proof by showing that the supply yi(p) has the same graph as the vector
ci of costs. If p = c
k




i ), then yi(p) = k.
3.3 Individual rationality from the exchange economy perspective
The ﬁnal step in our argument demonstrates that a buyer who only proposes bids or accepts asks
that are at or below his unit value exhibits individual rationality, as does a seller who only proposes
asks or accepts bids that are above his unit cost. We’ve carried out our utility function construction
for buyers and sellers with one or more units to trade at the equilibrium price. In the ZI simulations
each buyer has a positive value for one unit and each seller has only one unit available, so we apply
our construction to this case.
If buyer j only submits bids bj ≤ vj, this is equivalent to x
0
j − bj + vj + Mj ≥ x
0
j + Mj. For
buyer j with the utility function uj(x,y) in equation (1) and endowment (x
0
j ,0) of the currency and
the consumption good, rj(1) = vj and rj(0) = 0 so x
0
j −bj+rj(1)+Mj ≥ x
0
j +rj(0)+Mj. From the
deﬁnition of the utility function in equation (1), this is equivalent to uj(x
0
j −bj,1) ≥ uj(x
0
j ,0). With
indivisible units of the consumption good as in the experiments, this is the individual rationality
constraint.
The argument for seller i is similar. Suppose that seller i only considers asks ai ≥ ci. Assume
that seller i has the utility function in equation (2). Since ri(0) = 0 and ri(1) = −ci, the condition
ai ≥ ci is equivalent to the condition ai+ri(1−0) ≥ ri(1−1). This is equivalent to ui(ai,0) ≥ ui(0,1),
which is the individual rationality constraint with indivisible units.
4 Conclusions
In Section 2.2 we showed that the constraints that Gode and Sunder impose cannot be interpreted
as budget constraints; in Section 3.3 we showed that they are individual rationality constraints.
Gode and Sunder demonstrate that (ZI-C) traders reach approximate Pareto optimal allocations,
and that unconstrained (ZI-U) traders do not reach a Pareto optimal allocation. This establishes
that individual rationality is both necessary and suﬃcient to reach a Pareto optimal allocation.12
12 Hurwicz, Radner, and Reiter [1975] show that in any general equilibrium economy without externalities, random
individually rational behavior leads to Pareto optimal allocations in a simple trading institution called the B-process.
The B-process is deﬁned generally enough so that the double auction with discrete units is a special case. With a
discrete commodity space, as in a market experiment, random sequences of proposed trades submitted from each
agent result in a sequence of net trades. An element of the trade sequence is non-zero if submitted proposals include
a compatible trade (i.e., there is at least one trade proposal for which the net trade sums to zero). Hurwicz, Radner,
and Reiter show under weak conditions on preferences and technologies that if at every iteration of the bargaining
process, each individual only submits individually rational trade proposals, then the process converges to a Pareto
optimal allocation in ﬁnite time. In eﬀect, Gode and Sunder show that in a special case the B-process converges to a
Pareto optimal allocation, although they either did not recognize or did not acknowledge that they had imposed an
individual rationality constraint.INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 8
Price adjustment and convergence is a fundamental economic problem. Economists almost
exclusively formulate their price theories as equilibrium models, but price adjustment is by its nature
a disequilibrium phenomenon. Substantial market disruptions, such as shocks to demand or supply,
frequently disconnect price expectations from the actual market equilibrium price. Experiments
have provided much insight into how trade activity realigns expectations and trading strategies of
buyers and sellers with the market conditions that prevail after the disruption.
Practical problems of this sort are common. At a national scale, the closures of nine reﬁneries
in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in August 2005 led to a 27% reduction in domestic oil
production and a 21% reduction in U.S. oil reﬁning capacity (Yergin [2006]), which destabilized
prices of petroleum products for months. At a regional scale, almost every market was disrupted as
infrastructure was destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people relocated. In neighboring cities,
housing and labor market conditions were both greatly aﬀected by the inﬂux of displaced persons.
Economists do not have theories that indicate how prices will stabilize after such a disruption. Even
in more prosaic situations, such as a large expansion of an auto manufacturing plant in a medium
sized city, equilibrium models do not oﬀer much insight into the path of price adjustment in labor
markets, housing markets, or even markets for goods and services.
Price paths during these adjustment periods will aﬀect the proﬁts that accrue to sellers, which
in turn will aﬀect the rate of capacity investment by ﬁrms. Changes to capacity will aﬀect market
supply and further impact price adjustment processes. This long-run market adjustment problem
has not been addressed experimentally, nor do we have good models of its dynamics. This says
nothing of the interactions across markets, that is, the general equilibrium adjustment issues. These
are serious economic problems, and they call for serious economic models, even if those models
require some work to develop and to understand. Experimental economics and learning models are
particularly well positioned to make substantive contributions to these issues, but ﬁrst we have to
move beyond the simplistic view of market adjustment in the zero-intelligence model.
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